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The attack on Western religions by Western law
Re-framing pluralism, liberalism and diversity
Iain T. Benson1
Abstract
This paper discusses how law is increasingly being used to attack religious associations under the guise of “equality” advancement and “non-discrimination”
restrictions. I explore two important insights: first that the concept of “transformation” has been distorted, to shelter approaches to law that fail to respect properly
associational diversity. When misused, “transformation” seeks to change the moral
viewpoints or religious beliefs of religious associations by force of law. Second, the
paper discusses the expansion of law so that it becomes a threat to associations.
The “goods of religion” and the “limits of law” need to be more widely recognized and
understood both by religious communities and by those involved in law, politics and
the media. These insights demonstrate how “equality activists” employ a rhetoric
of “equality” to produce inequality, “diversity” to produce homogeneity and “nondiscrimination” to discriminate against religious communities and religious beliefs.
Several solutions for identifying these errors and resisting them are outlined in brief.
Keywords	Law and religion, definitions of liberalism, pluralism, diversity, transformative constitutionalism, political theology, civil religion, constitutional theocracy, law as religion, freedom of association, values versus
virtues, homophobia, heterosexism, civic totalism, egalitarian absolutism, holistic pluralism.

1. Introduction: Minimizing the public place for religions
and law becoming like a religion
Many people are aware that with secularism, understood as an anti-religious ideology
rather than in some of its more benign forms,2 we can see a movement that seeks to
1

2

Iain T. Benson (* 1955), BA (Hons.) (Queens), MA, (Cantab), JD (Windsor), PhD (Wits) Barrister &
Solicitor, Extraordinary Professor of Law, Department of Constitutional Law and the Philosophy of Law,
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein South Africa; Research Associate, South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Human Rights, Public and International Law, Johannesburg; Senior
Research Fellow, Chester Ronning Centre for the Study of Religion and Public Life, Alberta, Canada.
I would like to acknowledge Shaun de Freitas who reviewed this article and offered helpful suggestions. Article received: 14 May 2013; Accepted: 21 Sept. 2013. Contact: Iain T Benson, Ferme Loudas,
65270 St. Pé de Bigorre, France, Phone +33 (0) 5 62 41 84 67, Fax +33 5 62 32 87 40, Email:
iainbenson2@gmail.com.
Some wish to speak of “open secularism” etcetera as if the term “secularism” can be given a more pleas
ant face. For reasons I have set out elsewhere, I believe this strategy to be mistaken and that the term
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minimize the public place and relevance of religion. What is less recognized, however,
is that certain contemporary approaches to law wish to extend law and make it serve
the function, increasingly, of a religion with one moral viewpoint. By doing so, these
approaches attack religious associations themselves and usurp the proper social roles
that religions play including diversity in relation to moral debates of the day. This tendency needs to be understood and this article hopes to assist in its recognition and in
arguments to counteract the apparent legitimacy of such approaches.
Litigation over recent decades in North America, the United Kingdom, Europe
and South Africa has become more and more dominant as a forum not only for
legal battles but for “resolving” disputed social issues.3 What many are not so aware
of is the extent to which law has become dominated in a large part by highly secularized elites who function with concepts that are, whether they realize it or not,
deeply antagonistic to the properly public place for religious involvement and the
nature and role of diversity in a free and open society. Though many in these elite
groups use terms such as “equality”, “non-discrimination”, “diversity” and “pluralism” giving the impression that their theories will respect rights, pluralism and
diversity, what they mean by them is very different from what religious believers and
their religious associations might imagine these terms to mean in relation to the
freedoms of religion and association as long understood.

3

“secularism” should be used when we mean the essentially anti-religious ideology for which the word
“secularism” was coined in 1851 by George Jacob Holyoake. A similar problem exists with some uses of
the conception of “secular”. See: Iain T. Benson Notes towards a (re)definition of the secular (2000) 33
UBC Law Rev 519 and Considering secularism, in D. Farrow, (ed.), Recognizing religion in a secular society (Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 2004) 83-98. See also, arguing for what it calls “open secularism”,
Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (trans. Jane Marie Todd), Secularism and freedom of conscience
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2011) 58-60. What the authors describe as “open secularism” and support
as “neutral”, however, would be less confusingly described as “non-establishment.” “Secularism” has
an origin that is, in fact, anti-religious and understanding this and reserving the term to describe this
phenomenon serves a useful purpose. Nothing is added to “non-establishment” by employing the confusing term “open secularism”. The authors’ claim that “open secularism” is a “liberal-pluralist model”
that has, in Quebec, “achieved a satisfying balance, at least in comparative terms, between respect for
individual rights and freedoms and the imperatives of life in society” (60). This claim seems extraordinary
in light of the stream of litigation from that province by individuals and communities who argue that their
religious rights are being unfairly restricted. The legal facts deny the theory being put forward by Maclure
and Taylor. Their volume provides a good example of why the term “open secularism” should not be used.
I have put the word “resolving” in quotation marks here because it is widely recognized that the legal
process is far from an ideal way of building social consensus. Judicial review tends to produce “winners” and “losers” and does not tend to be suitable (to say the least) for the forming of compromises.
The larger the scope that law takes on for this form of “resolution”, the greater the temptation for
politicians to try and avoid “hot potato” issues by, in effect, delegating them to the courts. Neither suit
the ongoing purposes of a thriving constitutional order that respects the proper role of civil society and
the right of citizens to dissent and form associations of like-minded people around differing beliefs.
See: Charles Taylor, The malaise of modernity (Toronto, Anansi, 2001) 114 ff.

The attack on Western religions by Western law113

2. Identifying “pseudo-liberalism”, “civic totalism”,
“egalitarian absolutism” and making law into a religion
When examined closely, many contemporary conflicts, such as those involving religions
and disputes over sexual conduct and marital status, exhibit a “trump rights approach”
that would give one side greater weight than the other rather than strive to examine
context so as to ensure proper protection of diversity, dissent and difference. Such accommodation and toleration is necessary in order to safe-guard the importance of the
context for rights in a constitutional democracy – that is, the diversity which such theorists say that they support. It is important to recognize the divergence between a theory
that says it is “liberal” and “tolerant” with forms of academic or practical advocacy that
show by what they seek to accomplish that they are neither “liberal” nor tolerant.
What happens when one viewpoint seeks to dominate others without allowing
places for dissent (on such issues as sexual conduct or the status of marriage or
beliefs about gender roles between men and women) is that we see law being used
as the means of forcing one set of beliefs to be dominant. There are signs that law
is being used to usurp the role of religious associations. Recent writings by legal
scholars refer, approvingly, to both “constitutional theocracy” and “political theology” in which it is observed that law and politics can become theological in practice.
Such developments, of course, are a variant of the long history of ideas in relation
to “civil religion.”4 Still other scholars have written of the risk of human rights being
viewed as an “idolatry” or, on the other hand, observing that human rights is “the
new secular religion of our time” and do so without rejecting this new extension.5
The threat comes not only from this sort of divinization of law or politics but also
from a diminution of the protections that exist in law for religious diversity. Thus, one
recent book, published in Canada, views both “accommodation” and “tolerance” as
4

5

See, for example, Ronald Weed and John von Heyking, (eds.) Civil religion in political thought (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010)
See: Irwin Cotler, Jewish nongovernmental organizations, in John McLaren and Harold Coward, (eds),
Religious conscience, the state and the law (New York: SUNY Press, 1999) 77 – 96 at 77. Cotler was
formerly Canada’s Federal Minister of Justice as well as being a noted human rights expert. Taking a
very different approach to Cotler is fellow Canadian Michael Ignatieff, Human rights as idolatry, in Amy
Gutman ed. Human rights as politics and idolatry (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001) 53. Ignatieff writes
that: “[h]uman rights is misunderstood, I shall argue, if it is seen as a “secular religion.” It is not a
creed; it is not metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species of idolatry: humanism worshipping
itself. Elevating the moral and metaphysical claims made on behalf of human rights may be intended
to increase its universal appeal. In fact, it has the opposite effect, raising doubts among religious and
non-Western groups who do not happen to be in need of Western secular creeds.” Human rights, like
all areas of law, needs to develop a richer conception of context within which to interpret vague and
powerful terms such as “equality” and “non-discrimination” – much greater attention needs to be paid
to differential contexts such as those represented by religions. Respect within law and politics for a
robust conception of associational diversity and difference is essential to human freedom.
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obstacles standing in the way of “deep equality”. The volume suggests that it is necessary to move beyond both concepts in order to achieve a “cohesive” society!6 All of
these moves show a failure to understand the proper jurisdictions of law and religion
and exhibit an insufficient grasp of history and political theory and the dangers to culture when religions are suppressed and the law becomes, in essence, “theocratic.”7
The late legal historian, Harold Berman, rejected what he referred to as “a form
of secular religion or idolatry” which involved “…the worship of a constitutional
principle for its own sake, coupled with a high degree of scepticism concerning any
justification for such worship other than immediate self-interest, whether individual
or collective.”8 According to Peter Berger, a leading sociologist of the last half century:
There exists an international subculture composed of people with western-type
higher education, especially in the humanity and social sciences, that is indeed
secularized. This subculture is the principle “carrier” of progressive, enlightened
beliefs and values. While its members are relatively thin on the ground, they are
very influential, as they control the institutions that provide the “official“ definitions of reality, notably the educational system, the media of mass communication and the higher reaches of the legal system.9

What this means is that when we are dealing with the law and the media we must
recognize that these sectors are heavily over-represented by those, such as many
Western journalists, judges and lawyers, who have little time for religion at best
and actively wish to attack it at worst. It means, as well, that many simply do not
appreciate its importance and this is evident in their coverage and decisions.10 Ours
is increasingly a “show me” age in which empiricism matters increasingly to poli6

7

8

9

10

See: Lori Beaman, (ed) Reasonable accommodation: Managing diversity (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2012) the concept of “deep equality” that wishes to view both “accommodation” and “tolerance” as
passé is in opposition to a richer understanding of multi-culturalism and diversity that could be called
“deep diversity”; only diversity is consistent with freedom.
Giorgio Agamben, (trans. Leland De la Durantaye), The Church and the Kingdom (London: Seagull
Books, 2012) in his most penetrating reflection of the role of the Church in relation to time and pilgrimage, has noted the extension of law as follows: “With the eclipse of the messianic experience of the
culmination of the law and of time comes a most unprecedented hypertrophy of law – one that, under
the guise of legislating everything, betrays its legitimacy through legalistic excess” (40).
Harold Berman, Faith and order: The reconciliation of law and religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1993) 218.
Peter L. Berger The de-secularization of the world (Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 1999) 34 (emphasis
added). Such presence within the forces that give the most present cultural descriptions (education
and media) and decisions (politics and law) goes some way to explain the dominance of the widescale belief in “secularization” despite not only the lack of an empirical base to support it but greater
empirical proof for its opposite – the truth that religions are more significant world-wide not less.
See, on the empirical claims for the goods of religion, Brian J. Grim Religious freedom: good for what
ails us? (2008) 6 Rev Faith and Int’l Aff 3-7.
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tics and law. For this reason we must pay attention to the facts of the goods that
religions serve as well as the theoretical arguments for their respect. In this article
I will give some recent examples of the language and strategy of attacks on religion
and how a better understanding of key terms can serve to resist such attacks.

3. Culture needs religions: Law and politics are not
proper replacements for religious associations
For reasons that follow, the best view is that all these conceptions of law as a replacement for religion should be rejected since law is not capable of doing what
religions do culturally. Whether these attempts to mimic the roles and powers of
religion in law and politics are called “civil religion,” “constitutional theocracy,”
“political theology,” “human rights idolatry” or “deep equality,” all should be rejected as inappropriate usurpations of the public role of religions in culture and an
over-extension of laws that need to allow space for differing conceptions to co-exist.
Religions, which, by definition, believe different things are likely to conflict with
each other which is why associational independence is important not only to freedom but to peaceful co-existence. Religions understood properly as associational
are diverse and therefore stand necessarily “outside” the public, the political or the
legal (while they may overlap with each of these spheres and with other religions).
The quest to establish civil religion or to make an idol out of human rights or the
constitution is doomed to failure for several other reasons: briefly stated here are three:
1. Religious associations are joined (or have a significant voluntary dimension)
whereas, usually, citizens do not join a state in the same way. The boundaries
of the state are much more formal and difficult to change;
2. Religions maintain allegiance through binding by affection; the state and the
law do this in different ways. Related to this, religions seek to share their faith
in their project with others. The law and the state do not do this to the same
degree, nor should they; and
3. Religious associations are genuine communities with their own rules based
on transcendental commitments – the law functions differently. While there
may be similarities in that both have rich symbolic languages, there are important distinctions between law and its “community” of lawyers, judges and academics and those who live in religious communities. First, the law is there for
everyone and must be administered impartially between all sub-communities
that make up the wider culture and its common symbols should give fair access to all, not preferred membership or voice to some. Religious symbolism
and life does not operate this way. Superficial similarities between a “sacred
text” and the authority of law, or the idea of legal judges as “high priests”,
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should not be over-extended to draw a parallel between religion and law where
the social functions are so different and the effects of jurisdictional blurring
are negative.

4. Law as “constitutional theocracy” and politics as
“political theology” or “civil religion” should all be rejected
Canadian scholar Ran Hirschl, in his recent work with a most telling title, is correct
to refer throughout his book Constitutional Theocracy, to the “high priests of the
civil religion in Johannesburg” (187); “the high priests of constitutionalism” (citing,
particularly, South Africa and Canada as examples, 203); “today’s philosopher king
judges” (240); and in his reference to “the religion-like nature of the constitutional
scripture” (249). He is correct to do so if we speak of how some look at law but not,
however, if we accept (as he seems to) this as an appropriate view of the law.
Another temptation is to urge citizens to embrace the return to singular conceptions such as a political theology or a civil religion or a constitutional theocracy.11 In
each case, these singularities will be oppressive of the diversity of belief and opinion
that associational life alone provides. What is needed for the claims of those who
support civil religion or a “global civil religion” is not a civil religion at all, but an
approach to the appropriate delineation and furtherance of religions (plural) within
the civil and global settings. The law should be in the business of superintending, to
the minimum degree, the conflicts that extend beyond what is acceptable between the
communities. There are limits to religion and what an association may wish to do,
as there are for all areas of human endeavour. The articulation of the limit, however,
must recognize the limitations of law itself, something that law has been rather weak
at doing.12 Like “civil religion” we need to be wary of these attempts to divinize or
idolatrize law and human rights or politics and explain why they are inappropriate
usurpations of the role properly played by religions in societies.

5. What about claims that law can be “transformative”?
It is common to hear that law can be in the business of social “transformation”;
are all such claims illegitimate? In what way may we speak meaningfully about law
11

12

Ran Hirschl, Constitutional theocracy (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 2010); the sort of error committed,
in a different way by Paul Kahn in Political theology (New York: Columbia UP, 2009) and the latter’s
former student at Yale, Canadian academic Benjamin Berger, who, while he superbly explains why
law “fails to appreciate religion as culture” comes very close to suggesting that law constitutes both a
“community” and a “culture” of its own; see: Benjamin Berger, Law’s religion, in Richard Moon, (ed.),
Law and religious pluralism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 264 at 288.
See Francis Lyall, Religious law and its application by civil and religious jurisdictions in Great Britain, in
Ernest Caparros, (ed.), Religion in Comparative Law, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2000) 253; Michael J. Perry,
The political morality of liberal democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010) 75.
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as transformation? The answer is that we may speak of law as having ambitions to
transform society only if such legal ambitions respect adequately the basic conditions of a free and democratic society including respect for both associational
diversity and associational integrity. Law and politics must not unduly interfere with
religious associations and should, ideally, co-operate with them. Seeking some kind
of homogeneity or convergence in which religious communities are bleached out is
inconsistent with constitutional freedoms properly understood. What do we mean
by “undue” interference? Law or politics interfere inappropriately or unduly when
they attempt to force the beliefs or conscience of citizens to change, in relation to
matters that are openly contestable, in ways that are not chosen by the citizens
themselves. This places real and necessary obstacles in the way of quests for “transformation” that seek to crush religious diversity on certain matters.
There are many debates in contemporary society that raise controversial questions and that have irreconcilable philosophical or moral frameworks. Such matters as medical ethics in relation to abortion, euthanasia and a health care worker’s
“duty to refer” for example, or what matters will allow dissent in relation to controversial forms of marriage (same-sex marriage comes to mind) are not reconcilable
given the divergent starting points for analysis. Those who seek to change society
should do so through the co-operation of civil society properly respecting its diversity yet the temptation is to do so through the violence of law. To choose law for
wholesale reform over against religious diversity is to threaten freedom itself and
so such approaches cannot properly be considered transformative or acceptable.
This is why religious employers must be allowed to discriminate (i.e. make distinctions) in favour of religious employees or rules and why such distinctions are not
“unfair” discriminations with which the law should interfere as long as they are
done with sufficient notice and consistent practice and so on.13
What this says about “transformative constitutionalism”14 is that ambitions towards
reformation of society will have to take different forms with foci in different places
than the current focus on rights-based litigation which tend to create winners and
losers, not the conditions of accommodation and diversity which involve co-existence
13

14

Failure to grasp or accept the structural and contextual nature of distinctions so that not all distinctions or discriminations constitute “unfair” discriminations may be seen in various recent writings.
See, for example David Bilchitz, Why courts should not sanction unfair discrimination in the private
sphere: A reply (2012) SAJHR, 296 discussed further below and, generally, the collection of essays
edited by Lori Beaman, (ed.), Reasonable accommodation (2012), note #5 above.
As with other terms such as “liberalism”, “pluralism”, “equality” and so forth, the concept of “transformative constitutionalism” is multi-valent and so a variety of interpretations are possible. Not all will be
subject to the claim I make about “law becoming a form of religion” which I reject. See, generally, on
multi-valence, Malise Ruthven, Fundamentalism : A very short introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007)
5ff.
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with disagreement.15 Moving the focus of transformation from law to civil society
(including but not limited to politics) will, ideally, gradually shift the focus from litigation as a means of forced outcomes. This form of more consensual development will
perhaps, in some ways, result in slower forms of social development, to the chagrin of
activists, but in the long run it will provide a more meaningful form of social change
or understanding and avoid the risks of backlash that unjust approaches will produce.
The advancement of minorities and developments in relation to equality and
non-discrimination will continue but the focus will change direction and face,
rather than the courtrooms, the more appropriate chambers of change – legislative
chambers and associational meetings and the usual repertoire of active civil society
driven political frameworks. The emphasis will be less on legal challenges and outcomes where the advancement of particular agendas rather than associational diversity is presumed to be the important principle. The focus will and should be, increasingly, on political and civic discourse and debate seeking to change the minds
of those in different associations towards larger conceptions of shared goods. Also,
and this is key, the search for justice, when it is in the courts (as it will sometimes
rightly be) will involve the use of presumptions such as one that needs to be created in favour of associational diversity with a view to preserving and encouraging
diversity within appropriate legal limitations. Such presumptions may be rebutted
but the onus is on those who challenge associational and religious diversity, not on
the associations as is currently the case.

6. Understanding varieties of pluralism and liberalism
and rejecting false versions of both
All terms can contain ambiguity and multiple meanings. Similarly, there are a variety of
meanings and possible interpretations for most concepts. In relation to “liberalism”
and “pluralism”, however, it is important to choose conceptions of central terms that
respect and encourage diversity, and, as far as possible, independence. Some tend towards greater understanding of associational diversity and robustness, and others leave
that sort of question undeveloped. Still others are aggressively arrayed against religious
diversity and assume, if they do not express it openly, that law and politics should help
particular viewpoints to triumph publically. Some go so far as to suggest that other viewpoints than their own should be “attacked” legally and religious believers and their associations “coerced” by law to change their “hearts and minds.”16 On sexual matters,
15

16

I have written about the theory underlying this and the tensions in various approaches to liberalism in
Iain T. Benson, Living together with disagreement (Ballan Australia: Conor Court, 2012).
Two examples supporting “attack” and “coercion” are as follows: in the first, urging legal “attack” on
traditional views of heterosexual marriage and the other suggesting that religions should lose in conflicts with “equality” (particularly in relation to sexual orientation claims) and that law should “coerce
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religious viewpoints are stigmatized as “homophobic” or “heterosexist” and said to be
“abhorrent.” People who use this form of argument have no respect for others who hold
different viewpoints and would seek to force the alternative viewpoints on sexual morality to be treated as equivalent to racism – which, of course, sexual views are not, since
race is not a choice but sexual conduct (heterosexual or homosexual) is.

7. Towards “holistic pluralism”
A better approach to pluralism than these false and aggressive ones is a recent call
to recognize what its author refers to as “integral” or “holistic pluralism.” Fred Dallmayr seeks to overcome the extremes of either radical fragmentation or monistic
unification by a quest for an understanding of mutual relatedness and engagement.17
Dallmayr’s insight into the development of “integral pluralism” is important:
One might say that, whereas in traditional monism (as well as dualism) the unifying structure is imposed from the top down, the linked quality of integral pluralism emerges from the bottom up - in a way that can never be fully predicted or
exhaustively mapped.18

17
18

change in [the] hearts and minds” of believers, see: Pierre de Vos, Same-sex sexual desire and the
re-Imagining of the South African family, (2004) 20(2) SAJHR, 179 at 187 and David Bilchitz, Why
courts should not sanction unfair discrimination in the private sphere: A reply (2012) SAJHR, 296 at
314. Both writers would call themselves “liberals” yet more accurate assessments would reject their
perspectives, at least on these issues, as constituting “civic totalism” not liberalism since they allow
no space for diversity and have no respect for alternative moral viewpoints other than their own. On
the nature of “civic totalism” and why it applies to claims that religions should not be entitled to have
alternative viewpoints in relation to controversial matters, see William Galston, Religion and the limits
of liberal democracy, in D. Farrow (ed.), Recognizing religion in a secular society (Montreal: McGillQueens, 2004) 41-50 at 43-44, 49. The claim, implicit but clear, that religious viewpoints that say
same-sex sexual conduct is immoral should be challenged by law, and stigmatized as “homophobic”
or “heterosexist” (both terms which Pierre de Vos and David Bilchitz and others, use) effectively suggests that only the sexual moral views of those who accept the moral legitimacy of same-sex conduct
should be accepted. With this presupposition the stage is set to “coerce change” by force of law. Of
course, matters of sexual morality are precisely the sort of things about which reasonable people (and
institutions) ought to be able to disagree. That “sexual orientation” has more or less successfully come
to be viewed by a generation of jurists, lawyers and journalists, as conveying the right to act on that
orientation in all settings (including religious ones) is one of the unusual aspects of the current time.
Religions, of course, place restrictions on heterosexual orientation as well as homosexual orientation
(consider the prohibitions on “fornication” or “adultery” and rules involving marriage that apply to
heterosexuals as well as homosexuals) yet this is virtually never discussed because to do so would
suggest, rightly, that religious viewpoints are not “homophobic” but have a different view of sexual
morality for everyone no matter what their “orientation.” In this area, rhetoric trumps logic and the
terminology is as slippery as the tactics that are often employed to win arguments or court cases.
Fred Dallmayr, Integral pluralism (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010) 9.
Ibid at 9
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A pluralistic universe of the sort Dallmayr envisions, “is more like a federal republic than
an empire or a kingdom.”19 Again, quoting William Connolly, Dallmayr draws on the
ethical and political implications of mutual connectedness and engagement, and quotes
Connolly when he writes: “pluralism, particularly of the multi-dimensional, embedded
variety supported here, requires a set of civic virtues – in fact, pluralist virtues – to
sustain itself.”20 What this means is the search for a “public ethos” that “solicits the act
of cultivation of pluralist virtues by each faith [or group] and a negotiation of a positive
ethos of engagement between them.”21 Dallmayr invokes the importance of forbearance
and a “presumed generosity in a larger ethos of pluralism.”22 The essence here is cooperation, not domination and certainly not “attack” or “coercion.”

8. Religions have work to do in order to understand
and live within pluralistic societies
Dallmayr criticizes religion for erecting three obstacles in the way of integral pluralism:
1. The recruitment of religion for strictly worldly purposes, that is, its enlistment
in the pursuit of power, wealth and domination – possibly hegemonic or imperial domination (the “politicization of religion”);
2. The retreat of religious faith into a purely inward or “private” disposition,
shunning all involvement in social affairs – this is the opposite of no. 1 and may
be referred to as the “privatization of religion;” and
3. A quasi-Manichean division between good and evil, religious and non-religious motives – in the sense that an ethical or religious disposition is narrowly confined to private life, while politics, especially international politics, is
viewed as being entirely in the grip of immoral power politics.23

19
20

21
22
23

Here Dallmayr is quoting William James at 9.
Ibid at 11. The importance of re-understanding “virtues” rather than the common but shallow and
confusing language of “values” has been discussed by many contemporary philosophers and their
work is reviewed in detail in Iain T. Benson, Do “values” mean anything at all?: Implications for law,
education and society” (2008) Journal of Juridical Science 33 (1): 117-136. This distinction between
“virtues” and “values” goes to the root of the moral language of religion and society in our day. Despite
this, some religious writers fail, without any serious analysis, to appreciate its importance: see, for
example, John G. Stackhouse Jr. Making the best of it: Following Christ in the real world (Oxford: OUP,
2008) 337 n.20. The issue is a deep one and of critical importance as it goes to the heart of not
only moral language but the relationship between philosophy and theology. Similar unwillingness to
engage the problems of using “secularism” and “secular” incorrectly is also, unfortunately, a notable
feature of our times.
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid at 18
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To get beyond these obstacles, Dallmayr calls for ethical engagement and “lateral
embroilment.” This involves the work of “dialogue and interrogation.” Dallmayr
draws upon a wide variety of influences in order to describe this new approach to
pluralism and holism and notes:
Clearly, religious and ethical teachings are bound to impact contemporary politics - not
with the aim of solidifying a monistic power structure but with the intent of promoting
human self-rule and responsible democratic agency, an agency that remains open to
the demands (and plural interpretations) of ethics and religion. Differently phrased,
the task of religion and ethics in our time is not to buttress but to contest or critique
sovereign political power; for this reason, their locus of activity is mainly on the level of
“civil society” or the “public sphere” rather than that of government.24

Here, indicating that the project of integral pluralism is not utopian, is Dallmayr’s
recognition that “...unified harmony is bound to be accompanied by tension, disharmony, and struggle, a fact that is one of the hallmarks of integral pluralism.”25
The vision that Dallmayr develops of a pluralistic society committed to dialogue and engagement, fully cognisant of the ongoing reality of disagreement
and conflict, is one that clearly rejects, and calls for legal response in rejecting,
movements towards monistic domination of the sort just referred to. It is that
monistic domination, although phrased in the common but ambiguous language of “furthering equality” or “improving dignity” or rejecting “discrimination” or pursuing “transformative constitutionalism” that needs close scrutiny.
When methods are proposed, that in each case fail to respect difference and diversity, these lofty goals are no longer useful to a just application of the law and
are not justifiable.

9. Conclusion: Law should view religions more positively,
recognize their importance to the common good and
society and say so in legal judgments
Here and there a legal judgment may stand out as a beacon of insight in the rather
bland landscape of contemporary judgments that misunderstand religions and fail
to accord them respect. One notable exception to the general trend towards tepid
and unenthusiastic treatments of religion is the recently retired judge of the South
African Constitutional Court, Justice Albie Sachs. Here is what he said about religion
and community and culture in a leading case on religion in South Africa. I know of
no decision like it anywhere else. Sachs wrote:
24
25

Ibid at 19
Ibid at 20
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[F]reedom of religion goes beyond protecting the inviolability of the individual
conscience. For many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central
to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful
fashion to their sense of themselves, their community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support and nurture and a framework
for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has the capacity

to awaken concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights. It affects the believer’s view of society and founds
the distinction between right and wrong. It expresses itself in the affirmation and continuity of powerful traditions that frequently have an ancient
character transcending historical epochs and national boundaries.26
The Canadian Supreme Court, which has had ample opportunity to say comparably
strong or even encouraging things about the importance of religion, has never done
so. It has, nonetheless, recognized a relationship between society and the freedom
of religion as follows:
[the] freedom of religion is a fundamental right and represents a major triumph
of our democratic society. The philosophical and political values underpinning
Canadian democracy recognize the need to respect the diverse opinions and beliefs that guide the consciences and give direction to the lives of all members of
our society.27

Freedom of religion then is not just the right to have beliefs privately but the
right to engage in the public dimensions of manifestation, declaration and
teaching. What has occurred from time to time in Canada though, has been
a caving in to a reduction of the freedom of religion in two main ways: individualism and privatization. Sadly some scholars have also been guilty of these
errors. Thus, there are theories of rights in Canada and South Africa that are
reductive of the communitarian conceptions of rights contrary to the importance, in relation of religious rights particularly, of their community and public
dimensions.28
26

27

28

Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) para 36, (emphasis
added) per Albie Sachs J. (“Christian Education”).
Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St. Jérome-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), (2004) 2 SCR
650, para 64 per LeBel J. dissenting. On the essence of the freedom of religion see : R. v Big M Drug
Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 353-354.
Unacceptably “individualistic” reading of rights and particularly religious liberty may be found all too
easily in scholarly work in this area, see: Lorraine E. Weinrib, Ontario’s Sharia law debate, in Richard
Moon (ed,), Law and religious pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 239, 246-247.
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Three contemporary writers offer important insights. Oxford philosopher Joseph Raz,
himself not a theist, has rightly viewed religions as a key means of further conceptions
of the common good which can act as a check on the fragmenting tendencies of individualism.29 Another leading contemporary non-theistic philosopher, Jürgen Habermas,
has noted the importance of religious voices in the political public sphere, in a way that
would apply to the legal sphere, and adds an important caution about their truncation:
For functional reasons, we should not over-hastily reduce the polyphonic complexity of public voices, either. For the liberal state has an interest in unleashing
religious voices in the political public sphere, and in the political participation
of religious organizations as well. It must not discourage religious persons and
communities from also expressing themselves politically as such, for it cannot
know whether secular society would not otherwise cut itself off from key resources
for the creation of meaning and identity…Religious traditions have a special

power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable
forms of communal life. In the event of the corresponding political debates,
this potential makes religious speech a serious candidate for transporting
possible truth contents, which can then be translated from the vocabulary
of a particular religious community into a generally accessible language.30
What the current situation shows is that law is being used in many instances to attack and undermine the respect that should be owed to religious associations. As I
have demonstrated, resources exist within contemporary theory to challenge these
attacks on religion so long as religious leaders and their lawyers are made aware
both of the nature of these challenges and the best theoretical arguments with
which to expose and resist them. Claims for “equality,” “non-discrimination” or
“transformation” that are premised openly or covertly on getting rid of and attacking diversity, particularly religious diversity, must be recognized for what they are
– threats to the open society functioning under an appropriate approach to constitutional principles. No one should be fooled any longer: the claims by egalitarian
absolutists and civic totalists are illiberal and dangerous to ordered freedom and
need to be understood for what they are and challenged with more just arguments
that give place to contending viewpoints in a genuinely liberal manner that allows
for diversity and co-existence.
29

30

Joseph Raz, Ethics in the public domain: Essays in morality of law and politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994) 121.
Jürgen Habermas, Religion in the public square (2006) European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 14 No.
1, 1–25 at 10 (emphasis added). See also, Louis Dupré, The common good and the open society”
(1993) 55 The Review of Politics, 687 at 707-8.
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